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NARCISSISM, OVER-OPTIMISM, FEAR, ANGER, AND 
DEPRESSION: THE INTERIOR LIVES OF 
CORPORATE LEADERS 
Jayne W. Barnard* 
How can we account for dysfunctional boards? Part of the answer 
may rest with dysfunctional directors. They may be control freaks, suffer 
from delusions of grandeur, mistakenly regard their instincts as 
unassailable, or think that they are immune from society's rules. This 
observation should come as no surprise. People who have risen to the 
status of a public company director are no less human than gym 
teachers, athletes, gardeners, or astronauts; they, too, may be irrationally 
exuberant, childishly selfish, passionately wrong-headed, or morally 
lost. 
More specifically, corporate directors are not merely economic actors; 
they are complex, multifaceted, imperfect human beings. They are also 
highly successful, competitive, and proud individuals. As such, they 
may enjoy a sense of infallibility and entitlement, and suffer from an 
inability to recognize their own failings. This confluence of 
characteristics can lead to dysfunctional boards. 
In thinking about dysfunctional boards, the focus should begin with 
dysfunctional chief executive officers (CEOs). Even though the profile 
of directors is changing, a significant proportion of corporate directors 
are still current or former CEOs. 1 This Article will explore some of the 
recurring pathologies of CEOs-narcissism, over-optimism, fear, anger, 
and depression. 2 It will then consider the impact of these pathologies on 
organizations-hyper-deference, reluctance to provide truthful 
information to the boss, bullying and intimidation up and down the 
chain of command, and constantly shifting corporate priorities.3 Finally, 
* James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. Thanks to Maire 
Corcoran and Kate Celender, William & Mary Class of 2009, for their research support for this Article. 
Thanks, too, to the participants at the Symposium on The Dysfunctional Board: Causes and Cures, 
especially Jack Stith and Jim Cummins, for !heir thoughtful comments. Lisa Nicholson and John Tucker 
helped me focus my thinking about the five pathologies and read early drafts. Thanks, finally, to Barbara 
Black for her leadership of the Corporate Law Center and for putting !his Symposium together. 
I. Search firm Spencer Stuart asserts that 33% of current directors are active CEOs. Board 
Leadership and Composition Becoming More Independent, 22nd Annual Spencer Stuart Board Index 
Reveals Board Changes, SpencerStuart, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.spencerstuart.com/about/media/46/. 
Many oihers are former CEOs. See id. 
2. See infra Part I. 
3. See infra Part II. 
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this Article will consider the compounding effect of multiple leaders 
reinforcing each other's pathologies.4 When directors fail to recognize 
CEO pathologies, or even worse when they share them, the 
consequences for corporations and their stakeholders can be significant. 
Certainly, any discussion of pathologies does not apply to all, or even 
a majority, of CEOs. Nevertheless, one can see troubling examples of 
leaders whose experience in the cut-throat environment of the executive 
suite has led them to paralyzing indecision, monumental rage, chronic 
sleeplessness, anxiety, and sobbing emotional breakdowns.5 Life at the 
top is full of stress and confrontation, and one should not be surprised 
that some CEOs cannot withstand the pressure. 
One also should not be surprised when some CEOs go over the edge 
in other ways--doctoring the information they share with their boards 
and with the public, orchestrating decisions that advance their personal 
goals at the company's expense, and sometimes by presiding over the 
kinds of meltdowns that have given rise to this Symposium-consider 
the excesses of Conrad Black, Dennis Kozlowski, Richard Scrushy, and 
Bernie Ebbers. Indeed, some CEOs may be "functional psychopaths."6 
Let us begin, however, with pathologies short of psychopathy, 
observing how they manifest themselves in the everyday lives of CEOs. 
The evidence of pathology is not hard to find. Most CEO pathologies are 
both observable and newsworthy. They command the attention not only 
of the business press, but also of plaintiffs' lawyers, federal prosecutors, 
whistleblowers, co-workers, competitors, and even admiring friends. 
I. RECURRING PATHOLOGIES AMONG CEOs 
We should begin by acknowledging the environmental trappings of 
corporate success. A CEO's world offers a lot of positive feedback. 7 In 
4. See infra Part Ill . 
5. See. e.g., Stephanie Marsh, Losing It , TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 2007, at 24 (recounting the 
psychiatric problems and recovery of Philip Burguieres, former CEO of Weatherford International, a 
Fortune 500 company); Stephanie N. Mehta, Confessions of a CEO, FORTUNE, Nov. 12, 2007, at 64 
(recounting the emotional challenges and recovery of Dominic Orr, former CEO of Alteon WebSystems, 
a Silicon Valley data-networking company). 
6. See Alan Deutschman, Is Your Boss a Psychopath?, FAST COMPANY, July, 2005, at 44 
(observing that "Psychopaths have a profound lack of empathy. They use other people callously and 
remorselessly for their own ends. They seduce victims with a hypnotic charm that masks their true 
nature as pathological liars, master con artists, and heartless manipulators. Easily bored, they crave 
constant stimulation, so they seek thrills from real-life 'games' they can win-and take pleasure from 
their power over other people."); Michael Steinberger, Psychopathic C.E.O.s, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2004 (Magazine), at 90. See also PAUL BABIAK AND ROBERT D. HARE, SNAKES IN SUITS: WHEN 
PSYCHOPATHS Go TO WORK (2006). 
7. Troy A. Paredes, Corporate Decisionmaking: Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: 
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addition, a CEO's life usually includes wealth, comfortable 
surroundings, prestige, glamour, and power. Offsetting these benefits are 
long hours, tight schedules, lack of privacy, grueling travel obligations, 
intense market scrutiny, second-guessing from the board, and, often 
(perhaps ironically), social isolation.8 
Some CEOs escape their situation through substance abuse,9 
adultery, 10 sexual adventurism, 11 extreme physical exertion/ 2 creation of 
a fantasy life, 13 or immersion in extra-corporate activities 14-someone, 
Behavioral Corporate Finance. CEOs. and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 716-17 
(2005) ("In general, CEOs receive much praise and recognition throughout their careers from the media, 
other executives, charitable organizations they support, politicians, and the like. Being a chief executive 
can be a heady experience."). 
8. Delaware's Vice Chancellor Strine has recently catalogued some of the other miseries of a 
CEO'sjob: 
Having to explain to employees why the corporation is off-shoring jobs and increasing 
the employees' share of health insurance costs, having to be lectured by a twenty-
something analyst about a penny miss in the quarterly earnings, and having to consider at 
board meetings cosmetic measures to improve the corporation's corporate governance 
ratings lest the corporation be subject to an array of shareholder proposals-these are 
really fun things to do. Add to that the increased focus on regulatory compliance arising 
out of the scandals of the tum of the century. Then top it off with a high level of public 
cynicism about CEO pay and integrity. Put it all together and being a public company 
CEO isn't what it used to be. 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of 
Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. I, 10 
(2007). See also STEVE TAPPIN & ANDREW CAVE, THE SECRETS OF CEOs: 150 GLOBAL CHIEF 
EXECUTIVES LIFT THE LID ON BUSINESS, LIFE AND LEADERSHIP (2008) (detailing the pressures and 
challenges facing CEOs). 
9. C.J. Prince, CEOs Anonymous: Hardly Acknowledged, Rarely Confronted, Alcoholism is a 
Stealthy Liability that Pervades Corporate America and Puts Some of its Brightest Leaders at Risk, 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, March, 2002 (noting an increasing number of referrals of top executives for 
interventions). 
10. See, e.g., Byron Acohido, Extramarital Affair Topples Boeing CEO, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 
2005, at IB (noting the board's decision to sack Boeing's CEO based on his adulterous affair with 
another Boeing executive). 
II. See, e.g., Vanessa Fuhrmans, WellPoint Finds Itself Embroiled in Private Drama, WALL ST. 
J., June 12, 2007, at AI (noting the firing ofWeliPoint's chief financial officer based on his complicated 
personal life, including relationships with several women, and shuttling back and forth between two 
"families," one in California and one in Indiana); Carla Hall, Lawsuit Has Fashion Mogul in Spotlight, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17,2008, at Bl (describing multiple sexual harassment lawsuits against the CEO of 
American Apparel, who admits he often attends business meetings in his underwear and once 
masturbated in front of a magazine writer during an interview). 
12. See, e.g., Diane Brady, Yes, Winning is Still the Only Thing, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 21, 2006, at 
52 (describing the CEO of Jarden Corp., who competes in ultramarathons); Tom McGhee, CEO Tough: 
Aging but Still Driven Execs Stretch Their Limits by Running Marathons, DENVER POST, Dec. II, 2005, 
at Kl (describing characteristics of the CEOs who compete in marathons). 
13. See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Executive Used Alias, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2007, at 
Cl (describing the actions of Whole Foods' CEO, who created a fictitious online personality to post 
laudatory comments about his company and his leadership). 
14. See Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey A. Tate, Superstar CEOs, (University of California 
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after all, must head up the Business Roundtable and the Council on 
Foreign Relations. CEOs may also cope with the stresses of leadership 
by diverting their energies to conspicuous philanthropy,15 excessive 
consumption, 16 sports team ownership, 17 or corporate buccaneering. 18 
Several scholars have explored the psychological terrain of top-level 
executives. We know, for example, that directors are often unable to 
admit that the failing company on whose board they sit is beyond repair. 
They simply cannot acknowledge to themselves that they may have 
failed in their oversight role or that they somehow lack the skills to 
make things right. 19 Like most people, directors may find it hard to 
question their own prior judgments; they may "over commit" to earlier 
decisions, even if those decisions were unwise. 20 They will also often 
ignore or discount new information. 21 
We also know that CEOs often misjudge their ability to extract wealth 
from takeover targets. CEOs accustomed to success-especially those 
who have recently been lionized in the press--often become "infected 
Working Paper Group, Paper 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=9 
72725 (noting the frequency ofCEOs who write autobiographies and take on public roles). 
15. See SANDY WEILL & JUDAH S. KRAUSHAAR, THE REAL DEAL: MY LIFE IN BUSINESS AND 
PHILANTHROPY (2006) (recounting the many charitable projects of Citigroup's CEO Sandy Weill, 
including fundraising for the Weill Medical Center and the renovation of Carnegie Hall). 
16. See Crocker H. Liu & David Yermack, Where are the Shareholders' Mansions? CEOs' 
Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=970413 (tracking CEOs' purchases of extremely 
large and costly estates). 
17. See Jeffrey Cohen, Yuan Ding, Cedric Lesage & Herve Stolowy, The Role of Managers' 
Behavior in Corporate Fraud (July 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1160076 (noting anecdotal evidence of CEOs who 
buy sports teams). 
18. See Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Expanding Without Managing, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at A29 
(describing the compulsive desire to acquire new companies exhibited by Dennis Kozlowski, Ken Lay, 
Bernie Ebbers, Gary Winnick, and John Rigas; Kozlowski was known as "Deal-a-Day Dennis"). 
19. A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. I, 4 (2003). 
20. See Katherine Hall, Looking Beneath the Surface: The Impact of Psychology on Corporate 
Decisionmaking, INT'L J.L. & MGMT. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper 
s.cfm?abstract_id=993313 (describing the role of cognitive biases in board-level decision making 
generally); Katherine Hall, The Psychology of Corporate Dishonesty, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 268 (2006) 
(describing specific cognitive biases including pre-occupation with self-image, the deflection of negative 
information and the commitment to a decision already made); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal 
Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor 
Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST. L. REV. 749, 768-71 (2007) (describing the cognitive biases and processes 
that often drive executive behavior); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory 
of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. I 0 I, I 08 (1997) (examining the impact of various "systematic 'perceptual filters,"' including over-
optimism, commitment to previous decisions, and seeing what one wants to see, especially if it advances 
one's goals, on c01porate decision making). 
21. Dickerson, supra note 19, at 5. 
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with hubris," and end up paying excessive acquisition premiums.22 
CEOs at the end of their careers may feel a special need to make one last 
splash and cement their place in history, so they orchestrate acquisitions 
impulsively.23 At the other end of the spectrum, new CEOs may believe 
their own press clippings24 and undertake deals that are beyond their 
competence to manage. 25 
Some recent scholarship has divided the CEO universe into 
psychological "types," positioning CEOs on scales that reflect their 
"militarism," "anomism," "hostility," and "adventurism"-and drawing 
correlations between each CEO's "type" and his or her company's 
behavior.26 Other recent scholarship has examined the relationship 
between personal facts about CEOs (e.g., divorce, death in the family) 
and their companies' financial performance.27 As it happens, these 
personal facts may have a significant impact on an organization.28 
European scholars have recently cautioned against attributing too 
much power to CEOs-most corporate decisions, they argue, are (and 
should be) made by teams. 29 Still, the prevailing "tone-at-the-top" 
literature suggests the influence of CEOs is both broad and deep. 30 
This Article adds to the current scholarship by focusing on five 
pathologies often seen in the lives of CEOs. It relies not only on 
academic studies, but also on lay observations of highly visible CEOs. 
22. See Mathew L.A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large 
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103 (1997). 
23. Joann S. Lublin, Aging CEOs Stage Big Deals as Career Finales, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1997, 
at Bl. 
24. See generally RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL 
QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs (2002) (noting the superhuman abilities often ascribed to new CEOs 
selected through a search process). 
25. Carly Fiorina at Hewlett-Packard may be one example of this phenomenon. See infra note 
115 and accompanying text. 
26. William C. Bradford, "Because That's Where the Money Is": Toward a Theory and Strategy 
of Corporate Legal Compliance (July II, 2007) (unpublished manuscript University of Florida 
Warrington College of Business ), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=95 
5428. 
27. Mark Maremont, Scholars Link Success of Firms to Lives of CEOs: A Family Death Hurts, 
Studies Say, As Does Buying a Mansion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2007, at AI. 
28. /d. 
29. Markus Glaser, Phillip Schl!fers & Martin Weber, Managerial Optimism and Corporate 
Investment: Is the CEO Alone Responsible for the Relation? (AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=967649. 
30. See Renee B. Adams, Heitor Almeida & Daniel Ferreira, PowerfUl CEOs and Their Impact 
on Corporate Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 1403 (2005) (concluding that powerful CEOs are likely 
to drive firms to "extreme consequences," both positive and negative); John M. Darley, The Cognitive 
and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1190 
(2005) (describing the process by which subordinates loyally implement the bad decisions of their 
leaders). 
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The sources used to illuminate these pathologies include critical 
biographies, magazine profiles, and the memoirs of these CEOs' 
subordinates and colleagues. Some of the subjects of these works have 
been spectacularly successful; others have brought their companies to 
ruin. What unites them, however, is the fact that they are flawed human 
beings. 
A. Narcissism 
The most common and easily documented characteristic of high-
visibility CEOs is narcissism-a sense of centrality and indispensability 
to the CEO's business. The existence of narcissism at this level is no 
coincidence: successful managers typically exhibit narcissistic 
personality traits throughout their business careers. Stated another way, 
narcissism conscientiously deployed often begets success.31 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that CEOs often exhibit strong 
narcissistic traits. Michael Maccoby argues that narcissism can be a 
"plus" in a top-level executive. 32 He acknowledges, however, that 
narcissistic executives can also suck the life out of an organization: 
No matter what their strengths, productive narcissists are incredibly 
difficult to work for. They don't learn easily from others. They are 
oversensitive to any kind of criticism, which they take personally. They 
bully subordinates and dominate meetings. They don't want to hear about 
anyone else's feelings. They are distrustful and paranoid. They can 
become grandiose, especially when they start to succeed. Perha~s their 
most frustrating quality is that they almost never listen to anyone.3 
It is important to recognize that narcissism is not the same as vanity 
or high self-regard. Nor is it merely "a stand-in for bad manners or rude, 
self-centered behavior."34 Rather, narcissism is comprised of several 
interlocked traits. First, "[a] true narcissist is the kind of person who (1) 
doesn't listen to anyone else when he believes in doing something and 
31. See Steve Fishman, Boss Science, N.Y. MAG., Apr. I, 2007, at 42, 44-47, available at 
http:/lnymag.com/guides/2007/otlicelife/30010/ ("Research suggests that he who climbs quickly is 
likely more talkative, social, and at the same time more obviously-obviously is the key word-
. dominant than his peers. 'He answers to himself,' as one management consultant puts it. He's self-
referential-'1 believe .. . ' is the way he starts every sentence. He has a talent for manipulating others' 
impressions .... 'He's the one motivated to sell himself to peers."'). 
32. See MICHAEL MACCOBY, THE PRODUCTIVE NARCISSIST: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
VISIONARY LEADERSHIP (2003) (positing that some narcissists-those he terms "productive 
narcissists"-can not only lead but transform their environments, citing Henry Ford, Bill Gates, and 
Jack Welch, among others). This book was updated and reissued as MICHAEL MACCOBY, NARCISSISTIC 
LEADERS: WHO SUCCEEDS AND WHO FAlLS (2007). 
33. MACCOBY, THE PRODUCTIVE NARCISSIST, supra note 32, at 203. 
34. /d. at 39. 
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(2) has a precise vision of how things should be."35 Narcissists are thus 
single-minded. "[They] create a vision to change the world; they are 
bold risk takers who think and act independently, pursuing their vision 
with great passion and perseverance."36 
Second, narcissists often exhibit "an insatiable [ ] need to be 
admired."37 Thus, "[they] are driven to [try to] be captivating, 
inspirational, charming, and seductive. "38 They cultivate what passes for 
people skills and use those skills to manipulate others. They see 
themselves as leaders whom others should naturally follow. 
Third, narcissists cannot tolerate what they perceive as disrespect. 
"They are oversensitive to criticism, don't listen to anyone, have a 
tendency to exaggerate to the point of lying, are quick to anger at put-
downs, are isolated, paranoid, and grandiose."39 Narcissism can be 
tiresome for those who must function in its orbit. Narcissism can also 
drive Herculean effort, and a passionate commitment to personal 
success. 
Jack Welch was a classic narcissist, putting himself at the center of 
GE's educational effort, loudly dominating management reviews, and 
micromanaging other executives' work.40 He would even rewrite his 
subordinates' presentations, re-drawing charts and selecting the precise 
words that they should use to make their (or his) arguments.41 Welch's 
narcissism also extended to his personal life. For example, Welch was 
very proud of his golfing skills and demanded that his subordinates tell 
him what other golfers said about his game. 42 He once screamed at his 
communications chief for publishing an unflattering picture of him in an 
annual report: "It makes me look bald," he complained.43 
"Over the course of his career, Jack Welch's dominance over GE 
became so complete, and his seeming need for acclaim so embracing, 
35. /d. at 9. 
36. /d. at xiv. 
37. ALAN DOWNS, BEYOND THE LOOKJNG GLASS: OVERCOMING THE SEDUCTIVE CULTURE OF 
CORPORATE NARCISSISM 17 ( 1997). 
38. MACCOBY, THE PRODUCTIVE NARCISSIST, supra note 32, at 67. 
39. /d. at XV. 
40. See generally JACK WELCH WITH JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT (200 I). 
41. BILL LANE, JACKED UP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW JACK WELCH TALKED GE INTO 
BECOMING THE WORLD'S GREATEST COMPANY 90, 113 (2008). See also John Cassidy, Gut Punch: 
How Great Was Jack Welch?, NEW YORKER, Oct. I , 2001 , at 112 ("As chairman, Welch interfered in 
every aspect of GE' s operations, down to vetting the scripts for refrigerator commercials. [He also 
personally negotiated) with Jerry Seinfeld to extend 'Seinfeld' for another season."). 
42. LANE, supra note 41 , at 202 ("Really!!! You played with him? What did he say [about 
me)?"). 
43. /d. at 3. 
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that by the end of his tenure as chairman and CEO, he seemed-to the 
outside world at least-to be running GE almost single-handedly."44 
Another legendary narcissist was Disney's CEO Michael Eisner. 
Eisner insisted on hosting the Disney television shows, refused to hire 
anyone reasonably likely to succeed him as CEO, and micromanaged 
every aspect of the Disney empire-rewriting scripts, selecting music 
for movies, and fiddling with the design of Disney's corporate 
headquarters in Burbank. 45 A student of architecture, Eisner initiated an 
international competition for the design of buildings at EuroDisney. 
Several of the world's most famous architects "made their presentations 
at Eisner's house in Bel Air over a four-day period, a veritable movable 
feast of architecture for Eisner .... "46 Eisner then spent weeks 
obsessing about design details for the theme park. He envisioned himself 
as "producer, director, editor, and even the actor[] in every foot of the 
[EuroDisney] film."47 Sometimes, he even imagined himself to be the 
spiritual, if not actual, heir to Disney's founder, Walt Disney.48 
Eisner's narcissism infused his management style. According to 
author James B. Stewart, 
[Eisner's management shortcomings] include[ d) an inability to delegate, a 
frequent mistrust of subordinates, impulsive and uncritical judgments, his 
pitting of one executive against another, his disrespect for any hierarchy 
or authority other than his own, his encouragement of a culture of spying 
and back-channeling, his frequent failure to acknowledge the 
achievements of others, and above all, his inability to groom a successor, 
notwithstanding his designation of Bob Iger as his heir apparent.49 
Citibank's Sandy Weill was another well-known narcissist50 as are 
Oracle's Larry Ellison51 and Martha Stewart Omnimedia's Martha 
44. CHRISTOPHER BYRON, TESTOSTERONE INC.: TALES OF CEOS RUN WILD 49 (2004). 
45. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEY WAR (2005). 
46. !d. at 83 . 
47. !d. 
48. !d. at 514 (recounting Eisner's habit of writing down the French version ofDisney-D'Isner. 
"Now look at this," he would say. "D'Isner . . . is Eisner without the D."). 
49. !d. at 532. 
50. See MONICA LANGLEY, TEARING DOWN THE WALLS: HOW SANDY WEILL FOUGHT HIS WAY 
TO THE TOP OF THE FINANCIAL WORLD ... AND THEN NEARLY LOST IT ALL 95, 364, 366 (2004) 
(noting Weill's maintenance of a scrapbook containing "fan letters" addressed to him; his "delight" at 
the number of times his picture was featured in the society pages of the New York Times, and the costly 
portrait he ordered of his wife and himself, which was unveiled at a black-tie corporate gathering). 
Weill's most visible acts of narcissism involved putting his name on the Weill Medical College of 
Cornell University and the Weill Recital Hall at Carnegie Hall. 
51. See KAREN SOUTHWICK, EVERYONE ELSE MUST FAIL: THE UNVARNISHED TRUTH ABOUT 
ORACLE AND LARRY ELLISON I, 22, 45, 133, 153-54 (2003) (noting Ellison's inability to tolerate 
anyone who stands up to him; his discomfort with anyone who might be perceived as a worthy 
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Stewart. 52 Perhaps the most narcissistic CEO in history, however, was 
Conrad Black of Hollinger International. Black angled tirelessly for a 
knighthood from the British government; surrounded himself with 
celebrities (Henry Kissinger and Margaret Thatcher); immersed himself 
in the study of his heroes (FDR, Lincoln, Napoleon), with whom he 
identified and whom he endlessly quoted; and always responded to 
criticism by claiming that his critics were simply jealous of his 
success. 53 Black's narcissism ran so deep that he commissioned Andy 
Warhol to paint his portrait54 and he replaced the "winged lady" hood 
ornaments on his Rolls Royce with his own symbol-a gold-plated 
eagle killing a snake. 55 
Why do these forms of narcissism matter in the larger scheme of 
things? Why should we care whether Jack Welch was a micromanager 
or Conrad Black loved the sound of his own voice? In fact, we might not 
care if these traits were benign or inconsequential. As we will see 
shortly, however, narcissism in a corporate setting can generate great 
harm. 
B. Over-Optimism 
Evidence of CEO over-optimism is less easy to capture than evidence 
of narcissism. First, unlike narcissism, over-optimism often feels good 
to subordinates and co-workers and rarely fosters resentment or leaks to 
the press. Second, over-optimism, at least in the short run, is often 
essential to leadership success. That is, to be effective as motivators and 
spokesmen for their companies, CEOs must be-or at least must seem to 
successor; his relentless desire to outperform Bill Gates; and his preoccupation with his personal 
legacy). "He's a narcissistic loner who thrives on being the center of attention and power." /d. at 291. 
See also MATTHEW SYMONDS, SOFTWAR: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT OF LARRY ELLISON AND ORACLE 
182 (2003) (noting Ellison's exercise of power and inability to delegate). "Whether he was suggesting a 
solution to some obscure engineering issue concerning the database, deconstructing some back-office 
process at Oracle to understand what was needed from applications to automate a business flow 
seamlessly, tweaking a sales compensation plan to eliminate perverse incentives, designing a 'portlet' 
for Oracle's executive dashboard, penning the latest ad, or sharpening an online sales presentation, 
Ellison was everywhere." /d. at 285. 
52. CHRISTOPHER M. BYRON, MARTHA INC.: THE INCREDIBLE STORY OF MARTHA STEWART 
LIVING OMNIMEDIA 102 (2002) (noting that Stewart viewed her employees as "not much more than 
stage props in the Martha Stewart Story ... the lifelong drama in which she played the starring role"). 
Stewart has exhibited a monumental need to control her environment. Stewart once told Oprah Winfrey, 
"I can almost bend steel with my mind. I can bend anything if I try hard enough. I can make myself do 
almost anything." !d. at 25. 
53. See generally TOM BOWER, OUTRAGEOUS FORTUNE: THE RISE AND RUIN OF CONRAD AND 
LADY BLACK (2006). 
54. /d. at 64. 
55. !d. at 57. 
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be-optimistic. They must articulate a future that encourages employees 
and customers to want to follow them. CEOs must also fashion a 
message about which investors can be enthusiastic. 
There is a difference, though, between well-grounded optimism and 
over-optimism (or "delusional optimism"). 56 Over-optimism is 
disconnected from business reality. Over-optimists fail to recognize the 
limits of human control. Over-optimism may be a function of lack of 
information or lack of judgment. 57 And, in the worst cases, over-
optimism may simply be a ruse, allowing a CEO to fend off critics and 
keep moving forward with a fruitless or misguided plan. 
CEO over-optimism was evident in many recent corporate scandals. 
For example, Ken Lay believed that Enron had a plausible business 
model and that real market dominance was an achievable goal. He 
repeatedly resisted advice from his investment manager to diversify his 
Enron-heavy portfolio. 58 When the company's share price began to drop 
in the spring of2001, "[h]is belief that [the] share price would pop back 
up was unshakable."59 Within months, of course, his over-optimistic 
prediction was proven to be dead wrong. 
Similarly, Bernie Ebbers believed that WorldCom's accumulation of 
telephone operating companies and expansion of broadband capacity 
could ultimately become a profitable enterprise.60 He also believed that 
using his WorldCom stock as collateral for massive personal loans was a 
good idea.61 Conrad Black believed that his Canadian media properties 
could be profitable, even though they were clearly cannibalizing each 
other; that he could beat Rupert Murdoch in a price war among London 
newspapers; and that his society friends would overlook and forgive his 
56. Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines 
Executive' Decisions, HARV. Bus. REV., July, 2003, at 57, 58. 
57. Mathew Hayward has suggested that over-optimism derives from a combination of excess 
pride, failure to get the right help, failure to read the situation, and failure to anticipate adverse 
consequences. MATHEW HAYWARD, EGO CHECK: WHY EXECUTIVE HUBRIS IS WRECKING COMPANIES 
AND CAREERS AND HOW TO A VOID THE TRAP II (2007). Troy Paredes has suggested that over-optimism 
may be a result of(!) the tournament process by which CEOs are selected; (2) the amount of power that 
is entrusted to CEOs; and (3) the vast compensation that is paid to CEOs. See Paredes, supra note 7 at 
678 (tournament), 680 (power), 678,713-20 (compensation). 
58. KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE STORY 370 (2005). 
59. /d. at 466. 
60. OM MALIK, BROADBANDITS: INSIDE THE $750 BILLION TELECOM HEIST 9 (2003) (noting 
that, under Ebbers' management, WorldCom bought up "about 70 companies and pushed the stock up 
7,000 percent"). 
61. /d. at 31 (noting that Ebbers borrowed some $900 million, posting his WorldCom stock as 
collateral). 
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growing legal problems.62 "True Believers, he told himself, always 
succeeded. "63 
It is important to note that CEO over-optimism does not always 
precede corporate failure. Even successful CEOs can get caught up in 
their message and fall prey to over-optimism. For example, Michael 
Eisner grossly overestimated the prospects for EuroDisney.64 He also 
overestimated the prospects of several of the Disney studio's movies.65 
Similarly, Jack Welch underestimated the public demand for a clean-up 
after GE dumped tons of PCBs into the Hudson River. He then 
overestimated his clout with the Bush administration, which finally 
made GE clean up the mess. 66 Andy Grove really believed that Intel 
customers would not protest about problems with the Pentium chip that 
gave rise to occasional mathematical errors.67 All of these leaders 
overcame these miscalculations. But, as we will see later in this Article, 
CEO over-optimism may also lead to disaster. 
C. Fear 
Another, often hidden, characteristic of many CEOs is fear. Evidence 
of fear is often hard to tease out, since CEOs labor to mask their fear 
from subordinates and co-workers (and also from themselves). They 
rarely write about it their memoirs and rarely talk about it with the press. 
CEOs face many external sources of fear-changing consumer tastes, 
day-to-day competition, economic downturns, critical media, pushy 
hedge fund managers who want to reorder the company's priorities, 
rogue subordinates whose actions will reflect badly on the CEO, 
demanding regulators, intrusive Congressmen, and every employee in 
the company who thinks he or she is smarter than the boss. 
Additionally, CEOs may face internal sources of fear. They may fear 
being discovered as an imposter, impotence to affect their will, and 
62. BOWER, supra note 53 (passim). 
63. !d. at 384. "Black believed his destiny was glory, regardless of the odds." !d. at 248. 
64. See STEWART, supra note 45, at 129. 
65. See, e.g., id. at 111-12 (noting Eisner's infatuation with Dick Tracy, which he thought would 
perform like Raiders of the Lost Ark. The film receipts "barely covered production and marketing costs. 
Merchandise tie-ins languished mostly unsold.") 
66. Laura Cohn, Christie Whitman Starts to Get Some Respect, Bus. WK., Aug. 27, 2001, at 61 
("When Jack Welch speaks, the White House-any White House-usually listens. So it came as a shock 
when Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christine Todd Whitman announced on Aug. I 
that General Electric Co. (GE) would be responsible for the biggest dredging project in U.S. history. 
Despite the vociferous objections ofGE Chief Executive Welch, a Bush campaign contributor, the EPA 
received White House approval to order the estimated $460 million cleanup of the Hudson River."). 
67. ANDREWS. GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE: HOW TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS POINTS 
THAT CHALLENGE EVERY COMPANY AND CAREER 12-14 (1996). 
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disgrace in the event of failure. For men, in particular, the fears are 
startlingly metaphorical--can I get it up? Can I keep it up? Core issues 
of identity are at the heart of these fears, and the pressure to perform is 
constant and unrelenting: "[E]very quarter you get an enormous report 
card," recalls one former CE0.68 "To be the final decision maker in a 
multibillion-dollar business with hundreds of thousands of employees 
and pensioners relying on you is an awesome responsibility. The stresses 
placed on CEOs almost require them to be superhuman and they are not 
always that well-prepared for the role."69 
Fear, of course, can be a great motivator/0 but it can also cause CEOs 
to make tragic mistakes. Many of the problems at Enron and WorldCom, 
for example, can be traced to senior executives' fears that they would 
lose their rock-star status if they could not make it appear that they were 
meeting their quarterly targets. 71 John Delorean went so far as to resort 
to an illegal drug deal when he feared (correctly) that his company was 
on the brink of bankruptcy. 72 
Fear may affect CEOs in less dramatic ways as well. When Oracle 
faced a serious cash shortage, Larry Ellison withdrew from his family, 
which shocked his wife: "There was a note in his voice that you didn't 
usually hear with him-just scared, worried."73 When Anne Mulcahy 
faced the possibility that Xerox would have to file for bankruptcy, she 
felt totally helpless and overwhelmed.74 
CEO fear, as in all walks of life, may cause anxiety, sleeplessness, 
hyper-vigilance, withdrawal, or various forms of compensatory 
behavior. In a job that is already solitary and insular, fear may isolate a 
CEO even further. 
68. Marsh, supra note 5 (quoting Philip Burguieres, former CEO of Weatherford International). 
69. TAPPIN & CAVE, supra note 8, at 13. 
70. GROVE, supra note 67, at 117 ("Fear plays a major role in creating and maintaining ... 
passion. Fear of competition, fear of bankruptcy, fear of being wrong and fear of losing can all be 
powerful motivators."). 
71. See EICHENWALD, supra note 58, at 164 (noting company-wide pressure to help Enron 
"make its numbers" at year end), 295 (noting that, "if [Enron] didn't hit its numbers, its executives 
wouldn't get their bonuses"). 
72. IVAN FALLON & JAMES SRODES, DREAM MAKER: THE RISE AND FALL OF JOHN Z. 
DELOREAN (1983). 
73. MIKE WILSON, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOD AND LARRY ELLISON: GOD DOESN'T THINK 
HE'S LARRY ELLISON 229 ( 1997). 
74. BILL GEORGE WITH PETER SIMS, TRUE NORTH: DISCOVER YOUR AUTHENTIC LEADERSHIP 
173 (2007) ("Around 8:30 p.m. on my way home, I pulled over to the side of the Merritt Parkway and 
said to myself, 'I don't know where to go. I don't want to go home. There'sjust no place to go."') 
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D. Anger 
If frustration breeds aggression, we should not be surprised to find 
that many CEOs get angry. When business goes bad or subordinates 
disappoint, outbursts of temper are often the response. Evidence of CEO 
anger is everywhere in the business literature. Some of the most 
prominent CEOs seem to lack any sense of self-restraint. 
For example, both Jack Welch and Michael Eisner were legendary 
screamers.75 Bill Gates would become so angry in meetings that he 
would spray spit all over the table.76 Similarly, Microsoft's Steve 
Ballmer regularly swore at anyone within earshot. 77 One of his senior 
managers scheduled a three-week trip to Nepal, joking that "maybe if [I] 
went high enough into the Himalayas, [I] could not hear Steve Ballmer 
screaming at [me]."78 
Citigroup's Sandy Weill was known for his "explosive" temper. 79 
Martha Stewart raged not only at her employees, but also at 
neighborhood children, local workmen, social acquaintances, and even 
75. Jack Welch, for example, was well-known for his "volcanic eruptions." LANE, supra note 41, 
at 311. Welch regularly could be heard yelling at his direct reports: "YOU DUMB SHIT!!!" and "You 
asshole! You're in deep shit! You get this cleaned up or you're outta here." /d. at 124,281. His shouting 
could even be heard through his "soundproof' office door. /d. at 201-{)2. Welch "actually seemed to 
enjoy picking fights with his executives . . .. It was Welch 's way of asserting control-the street-comer 
tough kid and bully from North Salem keeping his gang members in line." BYRON, supra note 44, at 
123. 
Michael Eisner regularly launched into "tirades" against his Disney colleagues (typically 
behind their backs). STEWART, supra note 45, at 161-62, 252. Eisner is variously described as 
"storming" through the office, "beside himself' when Michael Ovitz refused to resign, and "furious" on 
several other occasions. !d. at 253, 256, 266, 272, 375, 448. At one meeting, Eisner yelled at one of his 
senior managers: "Eisner looked like he might explode, his eyes bulging." /d. at 449. 
76. Charles Arthur, In Microsoft's Cool World, Top Man Was Mister Angry, INDEPENDENT 
(London) Jan. 15, 2000. As a young CEO, Gates' temper sometimes drove away customers. JAMES 
WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE: BILL GATES AND THE MAKING OF THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE 
152 (1992) (describing Intel ' s decision not to buy from Microsoft after a Gates temper tantrum). Gates 
was described as "confrontational," "absolutely purple he was screaming so much," subject to 
"screaming fits," and "visibly angry, sometimes throwing his pencil. He often yelled or pounded his fist 
on the table to make a point." /d. at 159, 162, 250, 280. Once, when a subordinate protested the 
workload, "Gates exploded, slamming his fist down on the table to get his point across and carrying on 
in a rage." !d. at 283 . During the government's antitrust case against Microsoft, Gates "erupted" in an 
interview with the Washington Post. KEN AULETTA, WORLD WAR 3.0: MICROSOFT AND ITS ENEMIES 15 
(2001). 
77. Ballmer once legendarily threw a chair across the room while engaged in a tirade about 
Google. "puu•• Eric Schmidt [Goog1e's chairman and CEO] is a [*••••• p••••. I'm going to [*••••• bury that guy. I have done it before. I will do it again . I'm going to [*••••• kill Google ." 
RICHARDS . TED LOW, ANDY GROVE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN 302 (2006) . 
78. JOHN WOOD, LEAVING MICROSOFT TO CHANGE THE WORLD: AN ENTREPRENEUR 'S 
ODYSSEY TO EDUCATE THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 7 (2007) . 
79. See Anthony Bianco & Heather Timmons, Crisis at Citi, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 9, 2002, at 34. 
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journalists.80 Her biographer described her as "deeply rehearsed in the 
politics of abuse."81 
This kind of behavior, incidentally, is what academics call "asshole" 
behavior. Stanford Business School's Robert Sutton, the originator of 
"asshole" theory, has identified several angry behaviors including 
"personal insults," "invading one's 'personal territory,"' "threats and 
intimidation, both verbal and nonverbal," "withering e-mail flames," 
"public shaming or 'status degradation' rituals," "rude interruptions," 
and "dirty looks" as among the "dirty dozen" of distinctively asshole 
behaviors. 82 
E. Depression 
Depression is the most difficult of the CEO pathologies to document. 
While narcissism and anger can rarely be masked and are often reported 
externally, depression, like fear, is often a closely-kept and shameful 
secret. Still, according to one former CEO, "[ d]epression is chronic and 
widespread in the executive office .... "83 In fact, this person, who now 
counsels other CEOs, has said that "50% of CEOs, at some time in their 
lives, experience depression."84 
Even though that estimate might seem unlikely, CEO depression is 
probably more common than we suspect. A handful of CEOs, including 
Ted Turner and CNN's Tom Johnson, have publicly admitted to 
suffering from depression. 85 More commonly, others have kept their 
affliction deeply hidden, instead confiding only in a trusted associate or 
two, secretly meeting with their psychotherapists after hours, and 
making excuses for their inability to concentrate or make decisions. 86 In 
the aftermath of his downfall, we have learned that Conrad Black 
suffered repeatedly from severe depression. 87 Likewise, Martha Stewart 
is said to have suffered from "fits of depression and [] threats of suicide 
80. BYRON, supra note 52, at 299-301 (screaming at employees), 9, 171 (screaming at children), 
281-82 (an encounter with a local tradesman that escalated into a charge of assault), 254 ("snarling" at a 
dinner guest), 182 (screaming at a journalist). 
81. /d. at 172. 
82. ROBERT I. SUTTON, THE NO ASSHOLE RULE: BUILDING A CIVILIZED WORKPLACE AND 
SURVIVING ONE THAT ISN'T 10 (2007). 
83. Marsh, supra note 5 (quoting Philip Burguieres). 
84. Faces of Depression: Philip Burguieres, http://www.pbs.org/wgbhltakeonestep/depression/fac 
es-philip.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2008) (quoting Philip Burguieres). 
85. See Susan Percy, Suicide & Mental Health lnt'l, Quiet Pain: CEO Depression and Suicide, 
hnp://suicideandmentalhealthassociationintemational.org/quietpain.html (last visited Oct. I, 2008). 
86. Susan Brink, CEO Sufferings Trickle Down, U.S . NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 29, 2003, at 
60 (describing the cover-up strategies ofCEOs suffering from depression). 
87. BOWER, supra note 53, at 130. 
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and even an event of self-mutilation."88 Jeff Skilling plunged .into a 
depression upon being named CEO of Enron, despite it being his long-
time dream. 89 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CEO PATHOLOGIES 
So far, this Article has recounted some evidence of five CEO 
pathologies. The stories are often colorful; perhaps they can even help us 
understand the role that personality can play in amassing and 
discharging executive power. These stories also suggest some tantalizing 
correlations between personality and abuse of power. This section 
further explores the notion that CEO pathology is more than an 
expression of personality traits. CEO pathology may have a real impact 
on a corporation and its performance. 
We begin with the proposition that dysfunction at the top tends to 
infect an organization:90 "When the boss is disagreeable, 
disagreeableness spreads."91 What, then, are the consequences for an 
organization when its CEO suffers from narcissism, over-optimism, fear, 
anger, or depression? The consequences (save for those related to 
depression) may actually be very positive. Indeed, CEO pathology may 
often be adaptive-a necessary ingredient in organizational success. Lee 
Iacocca and Jack Welch, for instance, were both narcissists. Yet, their 
insistence on conflating their personal identities with their corporations' 
public images undoubtedly played a positive role in Chrysler's resilience 
and GE's presence on the list of "best managed companies." Bill Gates 
and Larry Ellison were both over-optimists; both repeatedly over-
promised and under-delivered, at least until their companies could 
develop the products they believed were possible.92 Their enthusiasm for 
the future and their insistence that their employees could execute their 
personal vision carried their companies through the all-important 
formative years. All four of these men are now legendary in the 
88. BYRON, supra note 52, at 311. 
89. EICHENWALD, supra note 58, at 396. 
90. See generally Randall S. Peterson, Brent D. Smith, Paul V. Martorana & Pamela D. Owens, 
The Impact of Chief Executive Officer Personality on Top Management Team Dynamics, 88 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 975 (2003). 
91. Fishman, supra note 31, at 4 7. 
92. See WALLACE & ERICKSON, supra note 76, at 152 ("Microsoft overcommitted itself and set 
unrealistic deadlines, but as far as Gates was concerned, it was more important to get the sale and worry 
about the consequences later. And Gates had supreme confidence that he could handle those 
consequences."); WILSON, supra note 73 (noting numerous occasions when Ellison promised products 
Oracle was at the time incapable of providing). "Very often, Ellison would say that something was in the 
database that hadn't yet been done." SYMONDS, supra note 51, at 72. 
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corporate world. They each offer proof that "[a CEO's c]raziness [may 
be] an asset, not a liability. "93 
CEO pathology may also, however, have very harmful and often 
predictable consequences. Individual pathologies can impose significant 
harm on an organization. A combination of pathologies such as 
narcissism, over-optimism, fear, and anger can do irreparable damage to 
a business firm. In the next few pages, we will explore the nature of 
these influences. It is difficult not to conclude that CEO pathologies 
matter. 
A. Narcissism 
As noted above, CEO narc1ss1sm is more than self-absorption. 
Scholars have hypothesized that narcissistic CEOs are likely to exhibit 
"strategic grandiosity" and also to assemble "submissive" management 
teams.94 Additionally, it is important to narcissists that they not only 
seem, but actually be, in tight control of their environments. Thus, 
narcissistic CEOs sometimes commandeer their companies, initiating 
high-risk ventures, undertaking "bold, quantum, highly visible 
initiatives, rather than incremental elaborations on the status quo. In 
tum, narcissistic CEOs will tend to deliver extreme and volatile 
performance for their organizations .... [Each] new, transitory direction 
will tend to either be a big hit or a big miss. "95 When those initiatives do 
not succeed, moreover, narcissistic CEOs are likely to be slow to 
recognize failure: Their belief in themselves and their obsession with 
control can often lead to disastrous choices. 
High ego people are slow to recognize problems as attributable to their 
mistakes; rather, they minimize them as controllable and seek to correct 
them through an increase in persistence and aggression. Although this is 
an adaptive strategy on average, it can easily compound the risk 
(essentially, the phenomenon of throwing good money after bad).96 
Even when they do not undertake high-risk initiatives or fail to abort 
those initiatives that are unsuccessful, narcissistic CEOs can still have a 
debilitating influence on their organizations. Their self-serving behavior 
93. STANLEY BING, CRAZY BOSSES: FULLY REVISED AND UPDATED 68 (2007). 
94. Arijit Chatterjee & Donald C. Hambrick. It's All About Me: Narcissistic CEOs and Their 
Effects on Company Strategy and PerformanceS (May 4, 2006) (unpublished study, Pennsylvania State 
University's Smeal College of Business) available at http://jacksonleadership.cornlpdfs/Narciss 
istic_CE0s_05-04-06_ASQ.pdf. 
95. !d. at 13, 18. 
96. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate 
Irresponsibility and the Lessons ofEnron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968,974 (2002). 
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can lead to frustration from senior managers whose recommendations 
cannot get a fair hearing,97 development of an atmosphere of resentment 
and mistrust,98 cynicism among subordinates about their role in the 
organization,99 and diversion of resources from desirable uses to those 
that enhance the CEO's personal goals. 100 
A narcissistic CEO often blames others for his or her own failures 
while claiming credit for the good ideas of others. 101 The result may be 
an outflow of key talent, employees withholding their best ideas, and, in 
any event, simmering resentment. A narcissist may also squander 
valuable time micromanaging other people's work. Consider Jack Welch 
redesigning his sales managers' PowerPoint presentations, 102 or Martha 
Stewart's obsessing over the placement of commas in her television 
scripts, leading her writers to states of "near hysteria. "103 
Not surprisingly, narcissistic CEOs can be impossible to work for. 
Those CEOs who are intensely narcissistic (e.g., those who might be 
diagnosed as having Narcissistic Personality Disorder) are not only self-
referential and demanding, but are also exploitative and lacking in 
empathy. 104 Surely, working for toxic leaders like these can add to 
workplace stress and disillusion, absenteeism, "hiding" behaviors, and 
employee turnover. It can also decrease employee productivity and 
cooperation. 105 
Above all, narcissistic CEOs are impervious to criticism and advice. 
In part, they are able to avoid negative feedback by surrounding 
themselves with flak-deflectors-lawyers, public relations people, and 
97. DOWNS, supra note 37, at 36 ("The narcissist is inflexible and intolerant of differing 
viewpoints .... "). 
98. !d. at 28 ("The narcissist creates a working environment that lacks trust, then finds that others 
often mistrust her in return."). 
99. !d. at 37 ("The narcissistic manager denies the humanity of others, choosing to view them as 
objects, or modules, to be moved about the game board of the organization."). 
100. !d. at 59. ("[A narcissist measures] success not in profit and loss, but in the economies of 
personal achievement and glory."). 
I 0 I. !d. at 51, 54. 
102. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Welch was said to be "almost fanatical" about his 
own presentations. BYRON, supra note 44, at I 04. 
I 03. BYRON, supra note 52, at 300. 
104. Belinda Jane Board & Katarina Fritzon, Disordered Personalities at Work, II PSYCHOL., 
CRIME & L. 17 (2005). 
105. See, e.g., Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable Cons, 
HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 92: 
[N]arcissists are typically not comfortable with their own emotions. They listen only for 
the kind of information they seek. They don't learn easily from others. They don't like to 
teach but prefer to indoctrinate and make speeches. They dominate meetings with 
subordinates. The result for the organization is greater internal competitiveness at a time 
when everyone is already under as much pressure as they can possibly stand. 
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other sycophantic handlers. They also avoid criticism simply by failing 
to hear it. Michael Maccoby has vividly described this self-destructive 
scenario: 
[As a narcissistic CEO takes charge and initiates change,] he boasts ... 
that all his top executives support his moves. I hear from a key vice 
president that he doesn't listen when they disagree with him. He becomes 
cramped with paranoia. He tries desperately to control everything because 
no one can be trusted. He starts to see enemies everywhere. He can't slow 
down or stop, continuing on his path of expansion and debt even though 
his colleagues counsel against it. No one can talk to him. He thinks his 
critics are just protecting themselves or jealous and out to get him . ... 
No one can reach him, and he is fired three years after he took the 
. . 106 positiOn. 
Narcissism, in short, isolates CEOs and interferes with their ability to 
collaborate with co-workers and subordinates. More than just a benign 
accouterment of managerial success, narcissism has the potential to tear 
a company apart. 
B. Over-Optimism 
The consequences of CEO over-optimism are similar to those of CEO 
narcissism. First, over-optimistic CEOs may lead their companies into 
ill-considered ventures. Second, they may fail to recognize when 
corporate strategies are failing. Third, they may set expectations so high 
that employees must either cheat to achieve them or flee to escape them. 
Fourth, over-optimistic CEOs may stifle the delivery of bad news from 
below. 
"Celebrity" CEOs are especially prone to over-optimism. Once they 
get a reputation for exemplary leadership, they tend to see themselves as 
invincible. 107 These CEOs may, in fact, enter a "fantasy world" in which 
they surround themselves with acolytes and yes-men and fail to 
recognize the folly of their latest vision. 108 
Apart from the celebrities, however, let us consider more carefully the 
impact of CEO over-optimism. It reveals itself in recurring patterns. 
Over-optimistic CEOs typically overestimate the return on their 
106. MACCOBY, THE PRODUCTIVE NARCISSIST, supra note 32, at 130-31. 
107. Mathew L.A. Hayward, Violina P. Rindova & Timothy G. Pollock, Believing One's Own 
Press: The Causes and Consequences of CEO Celebrity, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 637 (2004). 
108. John A. Byrne, William C. Symonds & Julia Flynn Siler, CEO Disease, BUS. WK., Apr. I, 
1991, at 52. Interestingly, there is an observable correlation between the receipt of a "Best CEO" award 
and a decline in corporate performance. Malmendier & Tate, supra note 14, at 3. 
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investment projects. 109 In the thrall of an idea, they fail to consider the 
possibility of failure or even of routine results. 
When forecasting the outcomes of [these] projects, executives [often] fall 
victim to what psychologists call the planning fallacy. In its grip, 
managers make decisions based on delusional optimism rather than on a 
rational weighting of gains, losses, and probabilities. They overestimate 
benefits and underestimate costs. They spin scenarios of success while 
overlooking the potential for mistakes and miscalculations. As a result, 
managers pursue initiatives that are unlikely to come in on budget or on 
. d 1' h d 110 time--or to ever e 1ver t e expecte returns. 
Having initiated an ambitious project, over-optimistic CEOs then often 
fail to acknowledge that it is time to tum back or regroup. Georgetown's 
Donald Langevoort has dubbed this scenario the "optimism-commitment 
whipsaw." 111 
CEOs who are over-optimistic may also infect their organizations 
with aspirations that employees cannot achieve other than by channel-
stuffing, generating false invoices, or otherwise engaging in some form 
of fraud. Certainly, over-optimism at the top sometimes drives others to 
make foolish decisions. 112 The early part of this decade offered many 
examples of decision-makers who falsified financial figures because 
they wanted to ensure that their companies achieved ambitious earnings 
estimates. 113 Competent professionals also falsified their companies' 
financial statements in the mistaken (and over-optimistic) belief that 
failure to meet those estimates was just a temporary problem that could 
be solved in the subsequent quarter. 114 
CEO over-optimism may pervade the hierarchy in less pernicious 
ways as well. When CEOs promote over-optimistic expectations, 
subordinates may get the clear message that they should distort or 
conceal bad news. This problem is exacerbated when the CEO has a 
volatile temper or when, narcissistically, he or she personalizes 
109. See Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 
60 J. FIN. 2661 (2005) . 
II 0. Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 56, at 58. 
Ill . Langevoort, supra note 20, at 974. 
112. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The 
SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1150 (2003) (noting how CEO 
expectations can migrate to CFOs and subordinates, who then also get caught up in meeting unrealistic 
goals). 
113. See generally ALEX BERENSON, THE NUMBER : HOW THE DRIVE FOR QUARTERLY EARNINGS 
CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA (2003). 
114. See Former CEO Indicted in WorldCom Scandal, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at El 
(noting that, in pleading guilty to securities fraud, WorldCom CFO Scott Sullivan told the court "I took 
these actions, knowing that they were wrong, in a misguided ·effort to preserve the company to allow it 
to withstand what I believed were temporary financial difficulties."). 
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corporate performance and views every setback as a personal failure. In 
short, CEO over-optimism, like CEO narcissism, can blind a CEO to 
reality and lead a company to ruin. 
C. Fear 
The flip side of over-optimism is fear. Fear is likely to lead in one of 
two directions-recklessness or risk aversion. Fear may also lead to 
denial, indecision, and organizational paralysis. Importantly, CEOs 
driven by fear are unlikely to share their fears, so they fail to seek 
feedback from their subordinates or guidance from their boards that 
might help them identify alternatives to the plans so carefully locked 
inside their heads. Furthermore, fearful CEOs are often defensive and 
inflexible. They are unlikely to be able to receive constructive criticism, 
which may only exacerbate their fears. 115 
Fear, like over-optimism, can spiral both outward and downward: 
To overcome their fears, [CEOs] drive so hard for perfection that they 
are incapable of acknowledging either failures or weaknesses. When 
confronted with their failures, they try to cover them up or to create a 
rationale that convinces others these problems are not their fault. Often 
they look for scapegoats on whom to blame their problems, either within 
their organization or outside. Through the combination of power, 
charisma, and communications skills, they convince others to accept 
these distortions, causing entire organizations to lose touch with reality. 
I h d . . h . . . h f"" 116 n t e en , 1t IS t e1r orgamzahons t at su ter. 
In other words (and perhaps ironically), fear can exacerbate the 
optimism-commitment whipsaw. A CEO who has set unrealistically 
high goals and then sees the company falling short is likely to take steps 
to mask this failure. And, as Professor Langevoort has noted, a CEO 
who feels imperiled is likely to manipulate information, engage in 
diversionary acquisitions, and undertake increasingly risky strategies. 117 
As the threat of discovery grows, so too does the company's risk of 
115. Carly Fiorina may be one such example. She insisted she did not need help in orchestrating 
the integration of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq. HP's board ultimately decided otherwise. See Craig 
Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Carty Fiorino: An Ethical Case Study, 15 J. LEADERSHIP & ORG. 
STUDIES 188 (2008) (tracing the board's growing insistence that Fiorina hire a chief operating officer 
and the board's ultimate decision to demand her resignation); Ben Elgin, The Inside Story of Carly 's 
Ouster, Bus. WK., Feb. 21,2005, at 34 ("the board's proddings ofFiorina to bolster HP's operations 
talent went largely unheeded."). 
116. GEORGE, supra note 74, at 30. 
117. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent 
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 
GEO. L. J. 285, 307 (2004). 
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illegal activity. The greater the CEO fears failure, the more likely he or 
she is to succumb to the temptation to cheat. 
D. Anger 
Like a fearful CEO, an angry CEO may generate negative 
consequences for a company. Outbursts of temper may demoralize those 
who witness them, cause subordinates (quite reasonably) to withhold 
information that might evoke further outbursts, and, over time, breed 
resentment and disobedience. 118 CEO anger may also lead to ridicule 
and scorn. 
Anger directed downward is particularly toxic-employees who feel 
humiliated and disrespected are unlikely to perform at the top of their 
game. Employees who are bullied repeatedly, of course, may ultimately 
decide to quit and move on. Even those that remain, however, 
experience "[a decline] in work and life satisfaction, reduced 
commitment to [their employer], and heightened depression, anxiety, 
and bumout."119 In other words, "mean-spirited people do massive 
damage to victims, [to] bystanders who suffer the ripple effects, [to] 
organizational performance, and [to] themselves."120 
E. Depression 
We come, finally, to depression. There is little to say about this 
pathology, in part because it is so frequently hidden and in part because 
its impact has rarely been traced. Still, it is fair to infer that, when the 
CEO is holed up in his or her office unable to cope with the stresses of 
the job, or stays at home unable even to get out of bed, decisions are 
deferred, subordinates are demoralized, and opportunities are lost. And, 
unlike the four other CEO pathologies, nothing good is likely to come 
from CEO depression. 
F. Multiple Pathologies 
It is easy to see that any one of the pathologies described in this 
Article may inflict significant harm in a corporate environment; a 
118. In one case, a CEO's vituperative e-mail to his management team giving them a two-week 
ultimatum to "shape up," was leaked to the press, causing the company's stock to fall 22 percent. Philip 
Delves Broughton, Boss's Angry E-mail Sends Shares Plunging, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 6, 
2001. 
119. SUTION, supra note 82, at 29. 
120. !d. at 27. 
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confluence of pathologies can be even worse. Multiple pathologies can 
reinforce a CEO's worst instincts. For example, an over-optimistic CEO 
who systematically discounts risk may compound that error if he or she 
narcissistically rejects criticism. A narcissistic CEO who is mistrustful 
and controlling may become even more so when acting from a position 
of fear. 
Pathologies, in short, can align in many combinations. They may also 
ebb and flow with age, family circumstances, social position, and (real 
and perceived) business success. In other words, pathologies are not 
static and-to some degree-can be mitigated by conscious effort. Step 
one in the mitigation process is to know what pathologies are and how 
they may influence CEO behavior. Step two is to recognize whether a 
particular CEO is behaving pathologically, and if so, to assess whether 
that behavior is having a negative effect on the organization. Step three 
is to determine an appropriate course of action for dealing with the 
effects of the pathology or pathologies. The appropriate locus for this 
three-step process is, ultimately, the board of directors. 
Ill. IDENTIFYING AND MITIGATING CEO PATHOLOGIES AT THE BOARD 
LEVEL 
So far in this Article, we have looked at some evidence of CEO 
pathologies, observing both what pathology looks like and how it may 
shape the decision-making process. Boards often fail to grapple with 
CEO pathologies for many reasons. First, boards are made up primarily 
of CEOs, former CEOs and people who aspire to be CEOs. 121 These 
directors may fail to recognize CEO pathologies because they share 
them. Second, these directors may recognize CEO pathologies but fail to 
act on them because of their (self-serving) belief that these pathologies 
reflect healthy, competitive, successful behavior. Third, these directors 
may recognize CEO pathologies and also their harmful potential, yet be 
unwilling to correct the pathological behavior, at least so long as it 
seems to generate profits. Fourth, these directors may be bamboozled by 
CEOs who willfully mask their pathologies through charm, guile, or 
obfuscation. 
Individual directors may fail to address CEO pathologies for any of 
these reasons. Boards acting collectively may compound the problem. 
That is, scholars have conclusively established that individual 
shortcomings-and cognitive biases-are often reinforced in group 
121. See Board Leadership and Composition, supra note I (noting that, in addition to current and 
former CEOs, 21% of board members are now active or retired division managers or functional unit 
leaders, not CEOs). 
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settings; "[i]n particular, it has been shown that group dynamics [such as 
those that govern the boardroom] can bind group members together and 
blind them to their failings and excesses." 122 The phenomenon of 
"groupthink" in decision-making is one predictable consequence of this 
process. 123 Another is failure to identify risks from personality 
characteristics, such as narcissism or over-optimism, commonly 
associated with business success. 
Consider the problem facing corporate boards: Directors 
understandably bask in the reflected light of a successful CEO, they are 
happy to take credit when their CEO is a winner. Having selected the 
CEO through some form of competition, directors become highly 
invested in their selection; they want their CEO to do well. 
Psychologically, they believe he or she will do well. And, oftentimes 
they cannot bear for the CEO to fail. Failure impairs their own 
reputational capital. It also undermines their strongly-held sense of 
competence and control. 
Professor Langevoort has ably described how this dynamic may play 
out: 
[A] streak of good fortune for the firm-which may be managerial skill, 
but may be just as much the state of the economy--creates a 
psychological dynamic that works to the CEO's favor. First, the CEO has 
ample opportunity and resources to expand the board's external influence, 
thereby making ingratiation tactics more effective. The social ties grow, 
which makes the inclination to monitor diminish. Not far under the 
surface here are cognitive dissonance and a related set of commitment 
biases: the longer a streak of positive information flows, the more board 
members attribute that success to the person they've put in place and 
hence develop mental schemata that credit the CEO with skill. Once those 
schemata are fixed, they become increasingly hard to disconfirm. Any 
negative information that subsequently appears tends to be dismissed 
until the threat is undeniable, partly because of simple cognitive 
conservatism, partly because the board-having committed itself to the 
CEO by virtue of both selection and generous compensation-is averse to 
acknowledging that it may have made an error. 124 
In other words, directors themselves are sometimes subject to 
narcissism, over-optimism, fear, anger, and depression. The very same 
pathologies that can distort CEO performance can also distort the 
board's oversight role. 
122. Hall, Looking Beneath the Surface, supra note 20, at 17. 
123. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils ofGroupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1233 (2003). (describing the "groupthink" theory and analyzing its application in the context of Enron's 
board). 
124. Langevoort,supranote 117,at310. 
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IV. A PRESCRIPTION 
This Article suggests that boards of directors, as a by-product of their 
success, may be oblivious to the failings of others who are similarly 
situated and with whom they share a professional affinity. Moreover, 
they may fail to recognize signs that the CEOs and other senior 
executives with whom they do business are behaving pathologically to 
the detriment of the firm. What should be done to correct this harmful 
pattern of behavior? 
First, in addition to the many agenda items that a board must consider 
when it convenes, it should add one more-a systematic senior 
executive "pathology audit." In the context of setting executive 
compensation, discussing succession, or strategic planning, directors 
should at least annually "take the pulse" of their senior executives, 
conduct a performance evaluation designed to tease out behavioral 
problems, and squarely address the issue of CEO pathology. Is the CEO 
a narcissist and, if so, is that a subject that needs to be addressed through 
executive coaching or other intervention? 125 Is the CEO a mean son-of-
a-bitch whose temper tantrums or unrealistic expectations are driving 
good people away? 126 Does the CEO need a "sidekick" to 
counterbalance his or her pathological instincts?127 Has the CEO's 
pathology crossed over some tipping point, where the downsides of the 
pathology outweigh the benefits? If so, then the board may have to make 
the hard decision to say "goodbye" to its CEO. 
Second, directors ought to infuse their succession-planning exercises 
with an awareness of contestants' emerging and evolving pathologies. 
125. Simple mechanisms for diagnosing narcissism may include measuring the size of the CEO's 
picture in the annual report, counting references to the CEO in a company's press releases, and the 
length of the CEO's entry in Who's Who. See Chatterjee & Hambrick, supra note 94 (describing 
methodology for identifying CEOs with narcissistic traits). It may also include an assessment of the 
CEO's use of the corporate jet. See David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, 
and Inferior Corporate Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2006) (tracing the use of corporate jets by 
CEOs). 
126. This issue is especially important in companies with a young workforce. "Younger staffers 
simply won't stick around to work for idiot bosses .... Their reaction to a command-and-control leader 
who blasts off mean missives or ridicules customers? Post the comments on a blog." Diane Brady, 
Charm Offensive: Why America's CEOs Are Suddenly So Eager to Be Loved, Bus. WK., June 26, 2006, 
at 76. 
127. The use of a "sidekick" or "foil" is often recommended, particularly for so-called "visionary" 
leaders. Successful visionary-foil relationships include Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer and Warren Buffett 
and Charlie Munger. See generally HAYWARD, supra note 57, at 104-05. See also MACCOBY, THE 
PRODUCTIVE NARCISSIST, supra note 32, at 54 ("Almost every productive narcissist CEO today has an 
obsessive COO (and if they don't they probably should)."); Paredes, supra note 7, at 679, 681 
(suggesting that a "chief naysayer" might serve as an important counterweight to an overconfident 
CEO). 
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Today, we know a great deal about the stresses of the CEO selection 
process, 128 which itself often stimulates pathological behavior. 129 At a 
minimum, boards should impose a "no asshole rule" for top-level 
succession candidates. They should familiarize themselves with the 
signs of asshole behavior, making it clear to tournament participants that 
such behavior is unacceptable and will not be rewarded. 
Third, boards should consciously consider the possibility of their own 
pathologies and enabling behavior. Self-awareness and a serious 
discussion of CEO pathologies (including their own) may improve 
directors' own leadership and decision-making skills. 130 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Symposium has asked some important questions. What causes 
board dysfunction? How can board dysfunction be identified? What are 
the consequences of board dysfunction? How can board dysfunction be 
corrected? 
This Article has suggested one approach to these questions, by 
focusing on the psychological attributes of CEOs. The Article has 
examined five common CEO pathologies-narcissism, over-optimism, 
fear, anger, and depression. It has offered some detailed evidence of 
these pathologies among high-visibility American CEOs. It has also 
offered some thoughts on the organizational damage that these 
pathologies may inflict. It has acknowledged that CEO pathologies-
even severe pathologies-are not necessarily a formula for corporate 
decline or crime. 
Still, given the possible-even probable-adverse impact of one or 
more of these pathologies on organizations, the issue of CEO pathology 
should, like other performance metrics, regularly be on the agenda for 
serious board discussion. Boards should be on the lookout for CEO 
pathologies both during the selection process and throughout a CEO's 
128. See O'Connor, supra note 123, at 1252 (describing the "gladiatorial" nature of the executive 
selection process); Marleen A. O'Connor, Women Executives in Gladiator Corporate Cultures: The 
Behavioral Dynamics of Gender, Ego, and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465 (2006) (noting that women face 
systematic disadvantages as they ascend in the corporate hierarchy). 
129. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 20, at 971 (noting that the tournament process is "skewed in 
the direction of rewarding those who are highly focused at the business of competing, which of necessity 
means the cognitive ability to block out concerns-like difficult ethical problems-that are likely to be 
distracting"); Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite: 
Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1615, 1630, 1631 
(2004) (noting that the tournament process usually results in the selection of Machiavellian candidates 
who are "ethically and socially nimble" and who are "extremely aggressive vis-a-vis out-group 
members"). 
130. Hall, Looking Beneath the Surface, supra note 20, at 19. 
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tenure. They should also consider the role that pathologies may play in 
their own decision-making role. 
Most important, CEOs should cultivate a deeper awareness of their 
own tendencies towards pathological behavior. Reflection on the role 
that pathology can play in advancing toward leadership and exercising it 
wisely is an underrated virtue in the quest for corporate power. 
